Mosul: US policy toward state regulation “ISIS”

The control of state regulation in Iraq and the Levant “Daash” on the city of Mosul, the second largest city of Iraq, on June 9, 2014 represented a big shock, and especially that the state organization was awarded a quick media victory to expand and control on other cities and to form a threat of access to Baghdad and start crawling toward Irbil, and those developments were bigger than being ignored. The rise of state regulation , the expansion of its influence, control over large areas in Syria and Iraq, and then declaring an Islamic caliphate in the June 29, 2014 has contributed to change the US approach to the crises in the Middle East in general, and the Syrian crisis in particular, so it is no longer its resolve of a priority for the administration of US President Barack Obama, but to focus on the face of state regulation, and stop its expansion in Iraq and to deprive it from safe havens “in Syria. Based on what is mentioned above , this paper might be interested in the analysis of US policy toward the organization of the state, especially after more than a year of its control over the city of Mosul, and its fight against it. Accordingly, this paper is divided into several axes :

organization of the State in Iraq and the Levant “Daash”: the context of the emergence and influence

The emergence of this organization goes back , according to the Arab political analysis , to the exclusion and marginalization policies pursued by the ruling regimes in Iraq and Syria , and the overwhelming flowage that is sweeping the region as a result of the difficulties suffered by the political tracks to form a provoking element to ignite the speech for extremism which act well of investment of of local, regional and international situation, especially the regional and international understandings which does not take into account the interests of those targeted by political and religious discourse of the organization, such as the growth understanding between US and Iran at the time, and in this regard , it is to be said that Iran has been able during the US occupation of Iraq in April 9 / April 2003 to change its geopolitical position in the Arab Levant, and owning of effective influence tools in this Strategic theater, starting with western Afghanistan and through Iraq and end to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and such Iranian proficiency has motivated its closer allies to adopt policies of marginalization and exclusion towards the communities and local Sunni forces , and invest the remnants of al-Qaeda to practice hyperbole of power and legitimize tyranny from the gate of war on terrorism. The Iranian expansion in the region formed a suitable opportunity for the emergence of state regulation in Iraq and the Levant “Daash” which leaned on the growing sufferings of Sunni in Iraq and Syria , sharpens their religious and media speech, and took advantage of the strategic preferences of the administration of President Barack Obama that changed the rules of the US move in the Arab environment which dispensed of steel intervention strategies and direct supervision, and merely to adopt the administration from behind to follow the ways of non- expensive intervention .

Western analyzes have addressed, especially the US and in academic way reasons for the emergence of state regulation and historical roots, “Charles Lester” tried in his book “Islamic State: Brief Introduction” to answer a number of mutated questions about the historical roots of the organization in the Arab Levant , and its propaganda abilities that enabled to attract many of jihadi elements, and “Lester” sees that the organization of the state in Iraq and the Levant “Daash” Unlike other extremist organizations, has taken several steps to build its state, and its success in mobilizing many of the extremists who have the skills and managerial capacity to contribute to the construction of the Islamic state model.

The “Patrick Cockburn” has addressed in his book titled “the emergence of an Islamic state: Daash and new Sunni revolution,” the reasons for the emergence of state regulation, as he saw in the daily humanitarian violations of the Syrian sunees suffered by the Syrian president and his regional and international allies since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in General 2011, and the structural problems experienced by Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. And “Patrick” sees that the Syrian war to be considered as the Middle East version of the European thirty Years War “in 1618 m -1648 m” between Catholics and Protestants, and the subsequent rapid disintegration of the joints of the state because of the ongoing war there, and adds that the destruction of the Iraqi state and the marginalization and exclusion and sectarian killings of Sunni component in Iraq, paving the way for radical organizations to emerge and rise as the rise of the state regulation in Syria and Iraq.

In a related context, “Michael Lewis,” and Hassan Hassan adds in their books titled “Daash terrorism Army ” that Syrian President Bashar system contributed in the creation of jihadist groups, in addition that he set free most of jihadists detained in the detention centers . And the authors confirm that the Assad regime adoption of a strategy that will help in spreading terrorism to be used as an excuse to call his regime to the negotiations table with the international community to fight the terrorists , and then employ paper terrorism to undermie the Syrian opposition’s demands, and thus stressed that “Bashar al-Assad is not part of the solution against Daash, but he is part of its beginning until now. ”

And most of the American analyzes go , which addressed reasons of the rise of extremism in the Middle East, to the failure of US President Barack Obama’s policy in the region, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan .But there are an American analyzes add to the American failure ,that contributed to the emergence of state regulation , the management of the government in Iraq before the US invasion and after. As it is seen in authoritarian policies that adopted by former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and sectarian policies pursued by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, were the reason behind the emergence of state regulation, and the growing of its strength. From what is mentioned above , we note the broad consensus between the Arab and American analysis on the origins of state regulation.

Accordingly, the emergence of state regulation represents the crises of the Levantine state or the end of it , it will not be able to continue on its system and laws that have worked out many decades; the time in which the state established its rule and based on a single identity, specific identity of certain identities of the country, has ended. If Levantine state do not succeed in building a political arrangements to enable the rest of the country components to reach the institution of the resolution, at the same time to consolidate a true national space , they will remain in the bloody crisis, and always on the brink of collapse , and is threatened by the specter of the transition to Somalia, or Afghanistan, with all tragedies and devastation suffered by these two countries .

When Mosul fell in so resounding fall, the state organization began to review of its victory, which seizes on one of the oldest Islamic urban and most importantly, to establish Caliphate state in it , and the victorious Caliph ascend platform one of the oldest mosques , and the interpretation adopted by the US administration to a large extent concerning ISIL Daash ” that it is the legitimate son of the crisis of the political system, which was established in Iraq after 2003, and it was devoted in it during the past eight years of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki the tendency of monopoly, exclusive, and renewed the traditional belief of the single-identity rule in which all other country identities are revolved in its orbit and shrapnel. In this context and after the control of state regulation on the city of Mosul, a few days later, US President Barack Obama noted in his speech to the reasons of such control by saying: “Iraqi leaders could not to overcome their ethnic differences, and put it aside” The US President attributed the collapse of the Iraqi army to this political factors; when he said: “If the Iraqi security forces are unable to deal with the gunmen and fight them, this refers to the problems in the morale and commitment, rooted in the existing political problems in the country.”

Second : US intervention against state regulation in Iraq and the Levant “Daash”

The fall of the city of Mosul and the collapse of the Iraqi army inaugurated of new regional and international political stage, as the control of state regulation on more than 220 thousand square kilometers in the west of Iraq, eastern Syria and the approach of expansion to Erbil and Baghdad, and the removal of the political borders between Syria and Iraq demonstrated on the seriousness of the growing security threats and the limited containment policies . The most important data of changes of this stage is the resumption of US intervention in the Arab Levant environment.

In the seventh of August / August 2014 , US President Barack Obama ordered through his speech to carry out limited air strikes ” against militants of organization and delivered aid to displaced people of areas attacked by state regulation, especially religious minorities like Al- Ezeidean, whom the organization considered them as a idolatress group and permissible for them to kill their children and the captivity of daughters. In September / September of that year, the US president announced his overall strategy to weaken the organization of the State and destroy it when he said: “I will not hesitate to use force against Daash in Syria as in Iraq. This is the main principle committed by my administration : who threaten the United States of America will not find a safe haven.

Justifications emerged in this context that prompted the President to re-involve his country in the region for several reasons, some of it related to bad estimatation of its management of the depth of societal crisis in the Arab Levant and bounced on the interests of the United States in the case the the peoples of the Levant do not achieve its goals , and reach their political and social ambitions, as well as to the lack of sufficient knowledge of the goals of the organization of the state, where there was a conviction in Washington that the scope of work of organization is local , targeting local communities without threatening the interests of the United States in Arab Levant . US President acknowledged after the organization began to prepare for the invasion of Erbil, “the capital of the Kurdistan region , closer of its allies in the region “that his administration underestimated the seriousness of the state regulation, while they overestimated the Iraqi military force in dealing with it , and other reasons behind the return of the United States to pursue a solid policy is related to the extension of the regulation which breached the management of the Syrian crisis internationally, and turned Syria to a scene where security threats flowing to reach the world. As the seriousness of the consequences of enabling of state regulation and penetration power in the social classes in the region, and the inability to continue to employ it regionally and internationally, in addition to threatening energy resources trade in the Gulf and Levant were the basis of forcing the United States to review its policies toward the conflict files in the Levant and the transition from the position of asceticism to the involvement and leadership circle.

US strategy announced by President Barack Obama in his speech from the White House in Washington, at dawn on November 9, 2014 m, to confront the state regulation in Iraq and Syria based on the two basic axes : systematic air strikes , and support the “Sunni” forces to conduct ground fighting missions , and in Syria could intensify international approach in ways to curtail state regulation in three frames as follows: launch air strikes against state regulation in Syria, and not allow it in any “safe haven”, and the exchange of intelligence information; whether related to the structuring of the organization or financial and human resources, and work to coordinate of international efforts to curb the migration of foreign fighters. In addition to the lack of reliability on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and the claim of the existence of strengthening of the opposition to confront extremists, while continuing of the necessary diplomatic solutions to resolve the Syrian crisis.

The military respond to the rise of state regulation based on the following themes:

* Establishment of an international and a regional military alliance for the purpose of the face of the organization, which included 60 countries.

* Dependence on limited military intervention which is based on air strikes and the activity of intelligence and limited special operations , and avoid direct American military intervention.

* Arming, training and support allied ground forces , such as the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Syrian moderate opposition .

Perhaps the deeper problems of this response is the absence of the land forces that are reaping the results of air combing, and United States of America are still looking for an effective and military feasibility of a regional Sunni power to undertake this task without taking into account the interests and demands of this force , and its options are confined within the Turkish role which afraid of it, and the role of Iran which fear of its political consequences.

Consistent with this, the political and military American response based on what American officials call : the policy of “Daash First, Iraq first; the US government believes that to confront the state regulation is the main priority at this stage and should not be hampered by trying to expand the conflict to include other more complex issues such as the political solution in Syria. It also gives priority to Iraq for reasons, including the presence of a joint security agreement between the two countries and the presence of official relations with the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The United States linked its support to the Iraqi government in a package of political and military steps that it was requested to be adopted in order to integrate the Sunni Arab community and Sunni fighters in this confrontation and to mitigate the sectarian tension that was invested by the state regulation. Militarily , the United States asked to form Sunni armed force called the “National Guard” composed of tribal fighters and local fighters, and as a matter of fact the United States have already adopted , in the first months that followed the control of state regulation on the Mosul and other cities, the idea of ​​forming a “national guard” forces; In a press release issued by the President on September 10 / September 2014 AD, said the United States in addition of its support for the Iraqi and Kurdish forces , it “will also support Iraq’s efforts to build the forces of the National Guard to help the Sunni communities to secure their freedom from the control of state regulation.” It also demanded the restructuring and rehabilitation of the Iraqi official forces , including the seventh division of Iraqi Army deployed in Anbar .

Politically the United States of America accused the former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki of the great responsibility for what was happened in Iraq, and that was part of a rhetorical strategy to respond to the accusations made against the US President that he did not do enough to remain forces in Iraq. Therefore it has become to get rid of Nuri al-Maliki one of US conditions for a future political settlement, backed by what the Americans call of a government of more representative of the spectrum of the Iraqi society .

III Barack Obama’s strategy to the test: the fall of Al-Ramadi

The diplomatic, military, logistical and intelligence support provided by the US administration for the government of Iraqi President Heydar Ebadi, as well as support for troops of Anbar tribes were not sufficient to avoid falling the city of Ramadi, Anbar province to the hands of the state regulation in May / May of this year. As its fall triggered a broad debate within the United States on what is called “the failure of Obama’s strategy in the war on Daash.” In spite of the complaint within the US political circles of the lack of clarity in the face of the organization , the fall of the Al-Ramadi , in its details and gravity, is the one who launched this debate. In fact, it seems that there is no clear American strategy in its war against the state regulation. The US president, who described the defeat in Ramadi as a “tactical withdrawal”, he said, “we will win the war,” and returned to admit that there is no strategy for the war on the state regulation.

In addition, the level of American reaction to the control of state regulation on the Al-Ramai city was weak . There was nothing more than to increase the number of air strikes on their positions in a few percentage , and the announcement of to provide Iraqi forces with advanced shells. Perhaps this weak respond was due to the disagreement within the administration in the way of dealing with the organization of the State; as there is deep disagreement and contradictory visions in the perception of this war. The position of US President Barack Obama seems to be still with what might be called “interference of minimum”, and that he aspires to leave the White House as little as possible of military interventions, regardless of their political and strategic results for this position , while the term of former US President George W. Bush Bus was full of military interventions and toppling regimes , and the Republicans and some among Democrats and even the US military institution and the Ministry of Defense have interventions and pressures on the Iraqi government, and in all cases, this dispute within the administration, and the failure to build a unified strategy to confront the state regulation were also of the failure factors in this confrontation in spite of past more than a year on the fall of Mosul and the formation of the international coalition led by the United States of America.

Thus, the controversy did not prevent American options to be drawn according to the vision based on the balance between the various forces, and employ this balance for the service of its overlapping and conflicting priority in dealing with the phenomenon of state regulation . And these priorities can be summarized as follows:

* Limit the depth of the organization movement, and work hard to curtail and neutralize its tools .And to prevent its members from returning to their country, and continue to the approach of encircling them in Levantine geography and also their subject to the fire of war and ended.

* Retrieve control of Iraq, and hold its threads more closely, for its intrinsic value as a country of strategic oil site , and for the hope of holding of Kurdish paper as a pressure tool to all players in the region.

* Synthesis of Turkish behavior to ensure the American interests circles .

* Adapt the regional alliances that are willing to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, and employment in the context of the international coalition.

* The need to engage all local communities in the development of political choices in the Arab Levant taking care of local privacy, and helps in creating a political climate to issue a framework in which national powers are shared in the fight against state regulation.

Conclusion:

After more than a year of United States war against state regulation , it seems that there are two different rhythms in the understanding of this war; the rhythm of the United States “regardless of division within the United States to see this war : a slow rhythm , it is talking about a long-term battle stretching from three years to five years, and they must complete all of its elements, namely:

* Building forces of the local community in areas dominated by the organization of the State which shall undertake fighting it . It ensures the control of the land after its liberation and to do the police missions. And rehabilitation of these forces and build their capacity through training, armament, logistic support and intelligence.

* Weakening of state regulation, by targeting the sources of its strength, cut financial sources , and try to prevent the flow of volunteers to it , and the dismemberment of the geographical area controlled by.

The path of political reform should be equivalent to all of that, in the sense that the organization of the state is a product of the crisis of system of government in Iraq, and there will not be possible to confront it without dismantling its social acceptance base, and reintegration of the Sunni community in the political process.

The other rhythm is Iraqi, a fast rhythm, it wants to accomplish the battle in a limited months without being complemented by its members, according to the American understanding. Has not been supporting the construction of local forces, have not been supporting fighters of the tribes from the remains of Awakening organizations who proved of highly efficient in withstand to confront the organization of the State in more than one part of Anbar province, even before the fall of Mosul, when the battle began in the valley Horan, Late in 2013, and state regulation began to stretch in the province since that time, and the international coalition plans were not completed to target sources of power of the state organization, military, financial and logistical, and most importantly nothing was accomplished in the political reform file .

The battle to liberate Tikrit and Salah al-Din province was clearly revealed of these two different rhythms . There is no doubt that this contradiction in the rhythm of the war on the state regulation was one of the most important factors that confused battle. Many of the Iraqi parties, including the influential ones and of decision makers , do not agree with the US vision which was based on long-term battle.